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Economic theory indicates that because one's activities to improve health reward one in the
future, persons who value the future more highly will be more prone to healthy activity.
Without measures of time preference we can neither test this theory nor understand what makes
people value future events more highly.
Progress in this area requires a method to infer measures of time preference from the
secondary datasets used in public health and economic research. Time preference in its
econometric expression is the measurable forfeiting of additional goods in the present to enjoy
goods in the future. The rate of time preference varies from 0 for individuals who are indifferent
between present and future consumption to infinity for individuals who have place no value on
future consumption.  When subjects decide to forego higher wages in the present by taking
safer jobs that increase their chance of future survival they send signals about their time
preference (mixed with signals about risk aversion, other job prospects, family pressures, etc.).
These wage-risk tradeoffs offer scholars interested in measuring time preference the
convenience of a secondary dataset, but the drawback of needing to control for the
confounding and endogenous factors.
This study applies econometric techniques to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) to derive estimates of the levels of time preference for each labor force participant in
each of 15 waves of data from 1979 to 1994.  With these estimates I describe the evolution of
time preference over the life course.  I test the following hypotheses suggested by Becker and
Mulligan (Becker and Mulligan 1997)in their theory of endogenous time preferences: 1)Age and
Education reduce the rate of time preference; 2)Female gender and Father's Presence in the Home
at age 14 reduce the rate of time preference; 3) Religious participation reduces the rate of time
preference.  Finally I show that subjects with a more immediate time preference are more likely to
drink alcohol and conditional upon drinking are more more likely to drink heavily. A policy maker
with a better understanding of the determinants of time preference can design better policies that
empower children to value their future well-being and thereby increase present healthy behavior.
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Introduction
Empirical measurement of subjects’ rates of time preference requires observations of
subjects trading marginal future consumption against marginal present consumption.  Although
health behavior involves trades across time—pleasure increments now vs. health decrements
later—drawing inference on rates of time preference observed in this context is complicated by a
lack of common currency.  The work of  Thaler and Rosen (Thaler and Rosen 1976) and later
Moore and Viscusi (Moore and Viscusi 1990; Viscusi and Moore 1989) established that
observing labor markets where subjects trade higher wages in exchange for higher occupational
fatality risk could be a useful means of measuring rates of time preference.
This paper extends the models of Moore and Viscusi by 1) Relaxing the assumption that
workers are perfectly informed about occupational fatality risk; 2) Implementing a model of
endogenous time preference.   The extended model is applied to data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to test Becker and Mulligan’s (1997) suggestion that
subjects adapt their rates of time preference as their future prospects and mental capacities
develop.  The extended model yields measures of time preference for each subject for each period.
The validity of the time preference measures is explored by testing their relationship to alcohol use
in the NLSY.
The term “time preference” refers to a subject’s capacity to value future events 1.  The
formation of consistent plans for intertemporal consumption places restrictions on the relationship
                                               
1 The discount function β(t) is defined as ratio β( τ )= Ut(Xt+τ)/Ut(Xt) where Xt is a good consumed
at time t and Ut( ) is a utility function mapping consumption at various dates to utility at time t. The
rate of time preference is defined as –log(β). Having no time preference is when the value of future
satisfaction and the value of present satisfaction are equal in which case β=1 for all τ and time
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between future satisfaction and current satisfaction.  In theory, there is little reason for an optimal
plan to change when nothing has changed but calendar time.  Strotz described in 1956 the
alternative conditions that were necessary for time consistency, 1) The discount function is an
exponential function of the time which would elapse between the present and future consumption;
or  2) The discount function is purely a function of calendar time; or 3) The discount function is a
function of  other values whose evolution is completely determined by calendar time(Strotz
1956).
The presumption of dynamic consistency is a staple of models of intertemporal choice.
The typical assumption is constant exponential discounting 2.  The presumption is defended by
suggesting that agents can have perfect foresight into the future dynamic evolution of their
discount rates and employ precommitment strategies to enforce adherence to an optimal plan. In
reality the question of whether human subjects have discount functions that support dynamically
consistent planning is an empirical one.  There has been little evidence to support constant
exponential discounting (Ainslie and Haslam 1992; Cairns and van der Pol 1997; Loewenstein and
Prelec 1992; Thaler 1981).  This has led to greater consideration of alternative discounting
models and a concern that dynamic inconsistency, if true, would invalidate basic assumptions
                                                                                                                                                      
preference = 0.  Infinite time preference is when the subject does not value the future at all in
which case β=0 and time preference → ∞.
2 A notable exception is Uzawa’s demonstration that intertemporal models with discount
functions that depend on the level of consumption require the assumption that β would fall with
consumption (Uzawa 1968).  To assume otherwise would lead to a degenerate case in which wealth
accumulation approached infinity.  Uzawa’s assumption is counterintuitive to Blanchard and Fisher
who suggest that one would expect that the wealthy have more future oriented time preference,
β→1 (Blanchard and Fischer 1989).
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required to apply rational choice models to environmental, health, and safety regulations
(Loewenstein 1996).
One important form of dynamic inconsistency is the possibility that the cognitive
limitations of teenagers might render them incapable of foreseeing changes in their time preference
rates that will render them more concerned with their future welfare when they are older.  If
human development during the life course imposes dynamic inconsistency, it would offer an
alternative explanation for the wave of regret that accompanies retrospection on the indiscretions
of youth.    Accounts of “regret” require an unforeseeable shift in the potential for harm from an
activity.  Orphanides and Zervos  explain the regret from addictive behavior as rooted in
unforeseeable shifts in the potential of young people to become addicted (Orphanides and Zervos
1994).  Unforeseeable shifts in time preference would account for regret of non-addictive youthful
behaviors such as unsafe sex, petty crime, and delinquency.  Even if one granted that teenagers
are fully informed about the risks from smoking, drinking, and unsafe sex, one would hesitate to
press the welfare properties of a laissez faire approach to policies in this arena, if cognitive
limitations made teenage risk choices dynamically inconsistent.  A preliminary step to this line of




Measuring Time Preference in Individual Subjects in the NLSY.
Past attempts to obtain measures of time preference in individuals have used direct survey
methods to assess self-reported time preference (Fuchs, 1982; Viscusi, Magat et al. 1987).  But to
study lifecycle variation in time preference one would require data on a sizable longitudinal
cohort. Here, I identify individual measures of time preference in the context of panel data on
individuals making repeated choices between money and danger3.  Labor economists have
devoted considerable attention to identifying the wage-risk tradeoff locus over the past four
decades. See England (1992) for one review.   This literature on compensating variations has
recently been expanded to permit identification of  the discount rate and the coefficient of risk
aversion using readily available data on wages and occupational risk. (Moore and Viscusi 1988;
Viscusi 1993; Viscusi and Moore 1989).   It can be shown (Viscusi and Moore 1989) that in
weighing the local danger premium that a subject must consider the lifetime value of the extra
wages discounted by survival probability and discounted because of time preference.
The initial problem is the maximization of life time utility which can be written as:
                                               
3 Adam Smith is credited with the original observation that wages and danger are related.
According to Smith, “In trades which are known to be very unwholesome, the wages of labour
are always remarkably high”   (Smith, 1776).  Interestingly, the notion that risk attitude is
different among adolescents also appears to originate with Smith in precisely the context of
occupational choice.  On pages 122-123 of Book 1 he writes, “The contempt of risk and the
presumptuous hope of success, are in no period of life more active than at the age at which young
people chose their professions…. A tender mother, among the inferior ranks of people, is often
afraid to send her son to school at a sea-port town, lest the sight of the ships and the conversation

















U ( )  is the  utility function
pj(πj) is the perceived occupational fatality risk as a functional of true occupational risk πj
and px(πx) is the perceived lifetable fatality risk as a function of true lifetable risk,
πx.
(1-pj -px)
t  is the perceived probability of surviving  at least t periods given exposure to the
perceived job fatality risk pj,  and lifetable driven perceived fatality risk px.
w(πj) is the payoff of the jth agent as a function of the occupation (and risk) selected
β j is the discount rate of the jth agent
The model in Equation [1] modifies the Viscusi and Moore model by breaking the identification of
perceived risk with actual risk.   Imperfect knowledge of  risk is modeled by incorporating the
process whereby subjects perceive the fatality risks as “prospects” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979)
“p”  which have a functional association with the true risks now symbolized with Greek characters
“πj” and  “πx.”
In this stripped down model, the subject selects once and for all their occupation which is
parameterized only by its fatality risk.  That choice determines the subject’s wages according to
w(pj) and the subject’s survival (1-pj) for the subsequent t periods.
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To estimate the model I will need to apply functional forms to U( ) and w (pj) .
Viscusi and Moore (1989) explore the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functional
form which can be parameterized as U=(wc-1)/c. The limiting case of the CRRA utility function
that turns out  to be of interest for both exposition and estimation  is cà0 in which case the
CRRA utility function approaches the familiar logarithmic utility function.  I thus assume:
3.[5] U = [log ( w)]
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which can be simplified to yield
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Viscusi and Moore note that in actual practice the mortality risk is so low that the approximation
 1-p=(1-p)2 is warranted.  With this approximation [9]  becomes:
[10] 
































Augmenting [10] with a vector of observed variables xk and a vector of unobservable variables µ






































With an approximation that the perception of job fatality is  pj(πj) is a linear function of the
true job fatality, e.g. p(π)= k*π then the relationship between wages and the market can be
expressed as:
4. [12] log wj = C + (1-βj)((1/k)-πj-πx)[dlogwj/ dπj] + αj*Xj +µwj
The intuition for EquationError! Not a valid link. is straightforward.  A positive coefficient
on dlogw/dπ in Equation  Error! Not a valid link. would indicate that higher subject wages are
better explained by increases in "attractive local wage offers for dangerous jobs" when the subject
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faces a high probability of surviving his job risk and when the subject has a low discount rate (high
time preference).
To interpret (1-βj) purely as a measure of time preference requires that statistical controls
have been used for other mediators of the relationship between earnings and the danger premium.
The foremost two confounders might be 1) economic desperation and 2) intrinsic risk attitude.  I
will control for desperation by using measures of family size, race, schooling, and gender as Xj
variables.    Parameterizing risk attitude within specialized functional forms like the constant
relative risk aversion utility function offers one approach to making (1-βj) a cleaner measure of
“time preference”.
Note that if subjects perceive their risk perfectly k=1.  With this assumption the coefficient
of  (1-πj-πx)dlogw/dπj is an unbiased measure of (1- βj).  However what if subjects do not
perceive risk perfectly? If subjects underperceive risks it will make 1/k large leading to data
supporting a larger coefficient on the danger premium.  The misspecification bias from assuming
k=1 will lead to estimates of 1-β that are inordinately large. Because πj and πx are small, on the
order of 10-5, a good approximation for the magnitude of the misspecification bias is 1/k.
Eq Error! Not a valid link. imposes a restriction stating that other determinants of wages
(Xj) such as schooling, age, gender etc. will independently shift the relationship between wages
and wage-risk offers up and down (changes in intercept) but they will not alter its slope.  I will
loosen this restriction below.  The italicized term in Error! Not a valid link. dlogwj/ dπj  must be
computed.  To compute it, I will essentially use NLSY respondents as informants: They report to
me their region, their wage, and their occupation.   Using NIOSH’s National Traumatic
Occupational Fatality, data I convert reported occupation into a the fatality rate faced by that
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NLSY respondent in exchange for the wage they were given.   The statistical model implemented
is a regression of the form:
5.[13]  log wj = C +∑
k
[ β1k (Dk*πj )   + β2k (Dk*πj2 )  ] +  β xX+ ε
where Dk  are dummy variables for region, and year.
Equation [Error! Not a valid link.is a representation of the hedonic market equilibrium for
job safety (Kahn and Lang 1988).  Controlling for other determinants of wages, the coefficient on
occupational fatality will represent an equilibrium.  Competition for workers between firms in a
local labor market (determined by time and space)  establishes the local balance between firms’
willingness to invest in safer working conditions and their ability to simply raise wages to attract
workers who are willing to jeopardize their survival for cash.  Competition between workers for
jobs establishes a similar balance between local workers’ hedonic demand for better occupational
survival poised against decrements in wages.  As pointed out by Kahn and Lang (1988) were one
to simply to regress log wage the X variables and on occupational risk without the interactions,
the measures of dlogw/dπ would be endogenous in equation Error! Not a valid link..
  The X’s are other determinants of wage. After running this regression I can use the
results to compute as follows
1. [14]  danger premium =        d logwj /dπj  =∑
k
 (β1k )(Dk )   + (β2k )(Dk)(πj)
 Because its computation depends only on regional and annual dummies introducing the
predicted danger premium in Error! Not a valid link.will not introduce endogeneity bias.
Interacting dlog wj/dπj  with measures of ((1/k)-πx-πj) in which I set k=1 forms a new
independent variable,
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Zj = (1-πx-πj)* dlog wj/dπj
To estimate 1-βj  I note that it seems plausible that in Error! Not a valid link. not just the
intercept but the slope of the tradeoff between the danger premium and wages is a random
coefficient that differs idiosyncratically in general patterns suggested by Becker and Mulligan’s
(1997) theory of endogenous time preference. Becker and Mulligan's theory offers an account of
the determination of time preference by suggesting that individuals may alter their time preference
in part by spending time and effort  in forming mental pictures of future pleasures.  They cite as
examples of such time and effort activities like acquiring information through schooling, access to
print media, and time spent with older persons, particularly parents.  Subjects endogenously invest
effort in these activities in proportion to the agreeableness of their future life prospects.  For
instance, Becker and Mulligan speculate that because church attendance offers repeated promise
of future heavenly splendor it may lead attendants to endogenously develop ways to discount
future splendor less.
I  thus introduce a time preference determination equation inspired by Becker and
Mulligan:
[15]  (1-βj )=A+ γa * age + γs * schooling + γg * gender + γr* race + γf*father + γc*church + µβj
which forms a system together with a shorthand version of equation [12]
[16] log wjt = C + (1-βjt)*Zjt+ γj*Xjt  + µwjt
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Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) offers panel data on a cohort of
12,686 young persons aged 14 to 21 in 1979 followed up until when they are aged 29 to 37 in
1994.
Table 2 describes the essential variables from NLSY to be included in the analysis of
occupational choice. The National Traumatic Occupational Fatality data from NIOSH contains
occupation specific fatality rates for US workers.  These data have been merged with the NLSY
data in order to perform the occupational risk study.
From Table 2 one can get a sense of the magnitude of selection bias.  Attrition shrinks the
sample size from 12,686 to 8,889, individuals who can be followed over 16 years.  Attrition
means that observations on the effect of  higher age and later period are conditional on sample
non-attrition.
Multilevel Model Estimation:
Equation system [Error! Not a valid link.and [16] is the  multilevel system that will be
estimated using the 15 waves of observations on however many of the 12,686 subjects in the
NLSY report wages and occupations.  Equation  Error! Not a valid link. describes phenomena at
the level of the individual across successive rounds, while equation [16] describes phenomena at
the level of the individual within each round.  Our approach is similar to that taken by Cairns and
Van Der Pol (Cairns and van der Pol 1997) whose analysis of 2 rounds of survey data on
intertemporal preferences using multilevel models decisively favored the multilevel approach over
OLS.
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Computing Individual Time Preference Measures
In addition to examining the coefficients for equation [15] to assess the effects of age,
education, etc. on time preference,  I  will compute individual measures of βj that incorporate
estimates of the individual specific fixed effects µβj.  Estimates of βj can be derived which
maximize the joint likelihood function for the system set up by [15] and [16].
Obtaining Unbiased Standard Errors
The assumption that successive observations of the behavior of the same subject are truly
independent is likely to be false.  The error terms generated by the same subject in different years
are likely to be correlated and will result in heteroskedasticity. The multilevel model takes into
account precisely this form of heteroskedasticity.
Results
Determining the US Wage Risk Locus for 1979-1994
Table 3 presents estimates of equation [13] which is a first stage equation describing how
the equilibrium wage risk locus shifts across local markets defined by quadrennial periods and 4
regions composed of roughly 15 states each.   Although this is hardly the proper specification to
examine the effects of the productivity controls, it builds confidence to review the ways in which
the long established facts from labor economics are reaffirmed in Table 3.
Ø Marriage is associated with an increase in annualized wages of about 5% similar to previous
findings (Daniel 1995)
Ø Each year of schooling is associated with an increase in annualized wages of about  5% similar
to previous findings (Behrman et al. 1995; Schultz 1988)
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Ø Workforce experience more than tenure in a given job is associated with increased wages
similar to previous findings(Altonji 1987)
Ø Black race and female gender reduce annualized wages significantly see also(England et al.
1996)
Ø Union membership has a profound effect on wages (Leigh and Gill 1991)
Ø Occupational category controls appear to have reasonable effects as does job satisfaction.
All of the interaction variables are significant, and their coefficients are used together with
equation [14] to obtain individualized estimates of the local danger premia.  Job fatality
interactions with the occupational dummies were not used because of the theoretical requirement
that the dummies should mark off separate markets for occupational safety.  By the same token,
substantial migration on the basis of danger premia, would invalidate the use of the regional
dummies to identify the occupational risk vs. wage market locus.  There is no evidence to date for
migration on the basis of geographical differences in compensating variations.
Determining the US Wage Determinants for 1979-1994
Table 4 presents parameters from the wage equation [16].  which is estimated jointly with
the time preference determination equation [15] . The uninteracted covariates of wage have
roughly the same coefficients in Table 4 as were noted in Table 3.   The OLS estimates in Column
I are derived by simply including the uninteracted survival adjusted danger premium, Zj .  The
OLS estimates in Column II are derived by interacting each of the time preference determinants in
Table 5 with survival adjusted local danger premium. OLS standard errors are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity using White’s correction.  The Maximum Likelihood (multilevel) estimates in
Column III are random coefficients estimates  which append to the above interactions an
interaction between survival adjusted danger premium and a person specific error term.  This
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permits the model to account for unobservable idiosyncracies in a respondent’s approach towards
risky decisions.
A Tau test (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992) rejected the null of non-random coefficient on
the danger premium, thus the multilevel model offers the preferred set of estimates as well as the
preferred specification.   The random coefficients produced by the maximum likelihood technique
are displayed in Figure 1.  Their distribution is approximately normal and centered around a mean
of 5.3.
Can We Infer the Proper Discount Rate for Society?
As can be seen from equation [12] the interpretation of the danger premium coefficients as
indicators of the discount rate require the assumption of perfect perception of occupational
fatality rates (e.g. k=1).  Although Viscusi and Moore (1989) are inclined to make this
assumption, for both theoretical and empirical grounds, its validity is questionable.  An empirical
rejection of perfect risk perception in the NLSY can be based on the finding that coefficient on the
danger premium at 5.3 is roughly 10 fold higher than it would need to be to place the discount
rate in it’s theoretical range of 0-1.  If subjects underestimated the magnitude of their job fatality
risk by at least a factor of 10 (1/k=0.1) , it would bring the mean estimate of β into the theoretical
range.    Unfortunately in the absence of information about the quality of risk perception, the
empirical methods cannot deliver an absolute estimate of the population discount rate, nor  of the
value of future life.  Those interested in obtaining estimates of these parameters for their own sake
must either rely on unsupported assumptions or submit to disappointment.  For our purposes
explaining relative  variation in discount rates is fully sufficient and we now turn to this task.
The Determination of Time Preference
Table 5 indicates that controlling for covariates young age, male sex, and white race are
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associated with an immediate time preference and or a less acute perception of risk. There is no
evidence to support the conjecture of Becker and Mulligan that religious participation would
encourage a less immediate time preference.  We find no evidence to support the hypothesis that
the presence of a father early in life fosters the capacity to consider one’s future persistence and a
less immediate time preference.  Most surprisingly, we do not find evidence for an effect of
schooling on time preference.  According to the theory of endogenous preferences, schooling, by
enhancing future earning potential would foster more attention to future great expectations.  Part
of the reason for our finding no effect of schooling may have to do with sample selection bias.
The method used can only observe time preference in labor force participants. Labor force
participants in their teens and early twenties have self selected out of college.  Yet  among older
workers occupational choice estimates of college attenders are not comparable to non-attenders
because of differences in work force experience.  What more schooled subjects have in terms of
time preference, they may lack in terms of risk perception and vice versa.
The Relationship of Time Preference to Risky Behavior
To assess the validity of time preference measures derived from studying compensating
variations I test their performance in explaining differences in alcohol use.  Measures of time
preference have a prominent but infrequently tested association with health behavior in virtually
all economic models of health behavior (Becker et al. 1990; Becker and Murphy 1988; Fuchs
1982; Grossman 1972; Grossman et al. 1994; Grossman et al. 1996; Ribar 1994). Thus,  empirical
measures of time preference can also be used to assess the strength of this  association.  Health-
promoting behaviors that pay off in the future are more enjoyable to individuals who have lower
time preference. The theory of rational addiction (Becker et al. 1991; Becker and Murphy 1988)
highlights the way in which past consumption of an addictive good increases the marginal utility
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of current consumption. The theory predicts that individuals who greatly discount the future are
more likely to become addicted and will be more sensitive to shifts in the price of the commodity.
The policy implication of the theory is to use price shifts to alter addictive consumption of those
who discount the future (assumed to be youth) and use public information campaigns to alter
addictive consumption of those who value the future (assumed to be educated, adults) (Becker,
1991).   Indeed purely on the basis of the assumption that youth discount the future more than do
adults, the occurrence of  greater price responsivity among youth has been credited as evidence in
favor of the theory of rational addiction (Becker, et al. 1991; Grossman, et al. 1994).  The
evidence that youth are more price sensitive than adults is actually inconsistent (Chaloupka and
Wechsler 1996).
To apply the relative time preference measures to explain relative differences in alcohol
use rates, I first normalize the measures of β as Z-Scores then append them to a typical rational
addiction equation such as  Dt=C+ γ1 Dt-1 + γ2 Dt+1 + γ3 Pt + εt  where Dt denotes drinking at time
t and P denotes the price of a The two standard econometric problems to overcome in a rational
addiction estimate are A. Skewness in the distribution of addiction in the population and B.
Endogeneity of leads and lags of addictive consumption. To cope with skewness, I adopt a two
part estimation strategy employing an initial probit for any alcohol use followed by  estimates of
heavy drinking among the sample of drinkers.  To cope with endogeneity I adopt a two stage least
squares approach using as instruments leads and lags of the real beer tax.  The real beer tax data
which is used as the price variable is available by state for 1979-1994 and is described in detail in
{Chaloupka, 1995 #1017}.
 Table 6 indicates that more patience (High β) is significantly related to both any alcohol
use and  among drinkers to the measure of the number of days of drunkenness in the past 30 days.
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The three columns on the far right of Table 6 append to the rational addiction equation variable to
control for other elements that are correlated with β by the very nature of its construction.  Recall
that β is computed  according to Equation [15] as a linear combination of personal characteristics
such as age, schooling, gender etc. plus an individual specific fixed effect that is computed by
maximum likelihood. Appending the personal characteristics offers assurance that the effects
found in Table 6 are not simply the effects of these potential confounders.
Discusssion
The finding of an aging effect on time preference leads to the possibility of dynamic
inconsistency in planning one’s consumption path.  Finding that the measure of time preference is
an independent predictor of both drinking and drunkenness suggests that lifecycle shifts in time
preference are important for the study of health behavior. If adolescents fail to account for the
likelihood that they will become more patient with age, they could make decisions that would
have been rational had their rates of time preference remained constant, but which lead to regret
in the face of life cycle changes in time preference.
Conclusion
I have expanded and refined a method pioneered by Viscusi and Moore (1989) to examine
the response of subjects to various offers to trade their survival for money in the labor market.
Because I demonstrate that the estimates obtained in this way depend critically upon the
assumption of perfect risk perception, I do not share their conclusion that this method leads to
unbiased estimates of the absolute rate of time preference in a population.  I do believe that
measuring and parameterizing these trades is a promising strategy for the study of relative
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differences in risky decision-making between subjects in a population.  Although the measures
obtained in this manner confound both time preference and the ability to accurately perceive
fatality risks this confounding is neither conceptually nor empirically unappealing.  Both factors
are cognitive responses to contingent states of the world that dampen the full consideration of
possibilities other than the present moment.
The investigation found that subjects become more patient with aging and that patience is
independently correlated with less drinking and less drunkenness among drinkers.  The presence
of an aging effect on the discount rate leads to the possibility of dynamic inconsistency in planning
intertemporal consumption paths.  The fact that a “self” that starts down a consumption path
could differ in an unforseeable way from one’s future “self”  can lead to tragedy when the goods
consumed have addictive or irreversibly harmful properties.
 [Bauman, 1981 #852; Bauman, 1981 #853; Bauman, 1984a #857; Weinstein, 1980 #808;
Finn, 1986 #814; Elkind, 1978 #813; Jessor, 1983 #891; Greene, 1986 #858; Lewis, 1984
#894; Blyth, 1995 #890; Moffitt, 1993 #1762; Becker, 1997 #1759]
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Table 1. Cohort structure of NLSY.  Ages of subjects vs. Years of successive waves. The
final row indicates the number of years in which the corresponding age group is observed.
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Table 2

















Annual Real After Tax Wage 79-94 4657 7152 $9163 NLSY
Danger Premium (dlog w/dpj)
% ∆ $  per unit ∆ in Deaths/100K
79-94 4657 7152 0.0037 NTOF +
NLSY
Exogenous Included
Job Fatality Rate (pj) (Deaths/100k) 90-91 4657 7152 4.6 NTOF
All Cause Mortality (Deaths/100k) 1990 12686 8889 134.6 NCHS
Years of Schooling 79-94 12686 8889 12.7 NLSY
Race (%African American) 79-94 12686 8889 23.4% NLSY
Gender (%Female) 79-94 12686 8889 48.5% NLSY
Age 79-94 12686 8889 25.5 NLSY
Number of Dependents (Incl Self) 79-94 12686 8889 3.24 NLSY
Union Status  (% Members) 79-94 4852 6881 16% NLSY
Exogenous (Instruments for Eq. [13])
Period (4 quadrennial dummies) 79-94 12686 8889 NA NLSY
Pd1  (1979-1982) 79-82 12686 NA 0.20 NLSY
Pd2  (1983-1986) 83-86 NA NA 0.28 NLSY
Pd3  (1987-1990) 87-90 NA NA 0.29 NLSY
Pd4   (1991-1994) 91-94 NA 8889 0.22 NLSY
Region (4 separate dummies) 79-94 12686 8889 NA NLSY
Northeast 79-94 12686 8889 0.18 NLSY
South 79-94 12686 8889 0.38 NLSY
North Central 79-94 12686 8889 0.23 NLSY
West 79-94 12686 8889 0.19 NLSY
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Table 3
Dependent Variable is Log of Annualized After Tax Earnings*
Coefficient  t statistic
N 116,405
R2 0.4282
Job Fatality * North East 0.0416 (16.24)
Job Fatality2 * North East -0.0003 -(9.17)
Job Fatality * North Central 0.0289 (11.41)
Job Fatality2 * North Central -0.0002 -(6.23)
Job Fatality * South 0.0306 (12.18)
Job Fatality2 * South -0.0002 -(6.5)
Job Fatality * West 0.0416 (16.36)
Job Fatality2 * West -0.0003 -(9.27)
Job Fatality * Period 1 -0.0311 -(12.24)
Job Fatality2 * Period 1 0.0002 (7.05)
Job Fatality * Period 2 -0.0316 -(12.54)
Job Fatality2 * Period 2 0.0002 (7.12)
Job Fatality * Period 3 -0.0275 -(10.87)
Job Fatality2 * Period 3 0.0002 (5.84)
Job Fatality * Period 4 -0.0254 -(10.)
Job Fatality2 * Period 4 0.0002 (5.36)
Highest Grade Completed -0.0160 -(4.)





Job Tenure 0.0010 (35.18)
Job Tenure2 0.0000 -(19.86)
Experience in Job Market 0.0474 (25.41)
Experience2 -0.0005 -(3.85)
Union Member 0.1725 (44.47)
Job Satisfaction -0.0318 -(16.64)
Family Size -0.0144 -(17.8)
Married 0.0490 (15.58)
Managerial** 0.2723 (51.58)
Technical Sales 0.1831 (43.88)
Operators & Fabricators 0.1258 (25.65)
Precision Production 0.2327 (40.68)
Farm/Forestry/Fishing -0.0513 -(6.39)
Constant 7.5184 (139.17)
*Hourly Rate of Pay * 2000 Hours * (1-Tax Rate)
**Excluded Occupational Dummy: Service Industries
Period 1=79-82, Period 2=83-86, Period 3=87-90, Period 4=91-93
Table 3. Identification of the Regional and 
Period Specific Danger Premia
27
Table 4
Dependent Variable is Log of Annualized After Tax Earnings*
Column III
Unrestricted Maximum Likelihood
t-statistic Coefficient t statistic Coefficient t statistic





Constant 7.5073 (87.82) 7.6120 (78.61) 7.7998 ## (130.7) 0.0000
Survival Adjusted Local Danger Premium* 8.1250 (17.38) Distribution Distribution Shown in Figure 2
Union Member 0.1731 (29.38) 0.1721 (29.44) 0.1631 ## (40.56) 0.0000
Married 0.0539 (10.5) 0.0625 (10.56) 0.0536 ## (16.15) 0.0000
Family Size -0.0153 -(13.01) -0.0164 -(12.6) -0.0147 ## -(17.42) 0.0000
Highest Grade Completed -0.0226 -(2.48) -0.0045 -(.32) -0.0267 ## -(5.43) 0.0000
Highest Grade2 0.0027 (7.52) 0.0020 (3.58) 0.0029 ## (15.32) 0.0000
Experience in Job Market 0.0460 (18.48) 0.0356 (12.97) 0.0404 ## (19.46) 0.0000
Experience
2
-0.0003 -(1.98) 0.0000 (.01) -0.0002 ## -(1.53) 0.1270
Age 0.0787 (14.53) 0.0747 (11.17) 0.0702 ## (16.22) 0.0000
Age2 -0.0012 -(11.08) -0.0013 -(9.62) -0.0012 ## -(13.98) 0.0000
Job Tenure 0.0010 (25.65) 0.0010 (26.83) 0.0009 ## (33.21) 0.0000
Job Tenure2 -9.36E-07 -(14.84) -9.6E-07 -(15.15) -1.00E-06 ## -(17.61) 0.0000
Job Satisfaction -0.0340 -(13.33) -0.0339 -(13.37) -0.0360 ## -(18.59) 0.0000
Black -0.0413 -(6.64) -0.0306 -(4.46) -0.0372 ## -(9.23) 0.0000
Female -0.1651 -(28.15) -0.1731 -(25.1) -0.1655 ## -(44.36) 0.0000
North East 0.0223 (2.61) -0.0098 ## -(1.24) 0.2150
North Central -0.0929 -(6.45) -0.1445 ## -(17.26) 0.0000
South -0.0928 -(7.32) -0.1373 ## -(18.46) 0.0000
Managerial** 0.2601 (29.51) 0.2584 (29.41) 0.2317 ## (42.71) 0.0000
Operators & Fabricators 0.1644 (23.01) 0.1556 (21.78) 0.1462 ## (29.7) 0.0000
Technical Sales 0.1753 (25.91) 0.1784 (26.48) 0.1593 ## (36.77)
Precision Production 0.2711 (31.77) 0.2596 (30.31) 0.2322 ## (40.15) 0.0000
Farm/Forestry/Fishing 0.0108 (.77) -0.0222 -(1.57) -0.0157 ## -(1.98) 0.0000
Period 2 0.0383 (6.48) 0.0347 ## (6.76) 0.0470
Period 3 0.1457 (12.71) 0.1545 ## (21.08) 0.0000
Period 4 0.2179 (12.63) 0.2163 ## (22.61) 0.0000
**Excluded Occupational Dummy: Service Industries
Period 1=79-82, Period 2=83-86, Period 3=87-90, Period 4=91-93
*Computed value of dlog(wage)/d job fatality from Table 3, interacted with survival probability from lifetable.
Column I Column II




Dependent Variable is Coefficient on (1-π) dlogw/dπ
OLS* Maximum Likelihood
Coefficient t statistic** Coefficient t statistic
Tau Test for Null of No Random Coefficients 618
N 106880 106880
Constant -2.2082 1 -(1.81)
Lived with Father in 1979 0.5276 (.67) 1.2873 1 (1.53)
Religious Attendance 0.1763 (.77) -0.3103 0 -(1.4)
Age 0.4323 (.47) -6.3707 2 -(3.93)
Age2 0.0032 (.2) 0.1365 0 (3.45)
Highest Grade Completed -2.6616 -(1.45) 0.0435 1 (.03)
Highest Grade2 0.1111 (1.67) 0.0482 0 (.86)
Black -1.9782 -(2.04) -3.6676 1 -(3.69)
Female 2.7100 (3.1) 1.2739 1 (1.65)
Period 2 2.3159 (2.55) 3.8277 1 (2.73)
Period 3 2.6211 (1.62) 7.7066 4 (2.09)
Period 4 0.2505 (.12) -1.9350 9 -(.22)
Married -1.3113 -(1.68) 0.9411 1 (.79)
Family Size -0.0304 -(.16) -0.4653 0 -(2.47)
* Model from Column II of Table 4
**OLS Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity
Table 5. Estimating Time Preference in The Level 2 Equation. Dependent Variable is 
Coefficient on Local Danger Premium in Table 4.
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Table 6. Rational  Addiction Estimates of the Relationship Between Drinking and the Discount Rate
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Adj or Pseudo R2 0.0917 0.2853 0.0313 0.1209 0.2968 0.0637
N 5118 2801 2277 5118 2801 2277
§  Denotes endogenous variables in 2SLS models. Instruments for 2SLS models are annual real beer taxes from 1979-1994.
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Figure 1.
Figure 2
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
